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AN APPROACH TO MANAGING FISHERIES WHEN WEAK AND STRONG STOCKS MIX 
David Tomberlin, NOAA Fisheries, david.tomberlin@noaa.gov 
ABSTRACT 
When weak and strong fish stocks are caught in the same fishery, managing for the protection of the weak 
stock may result in foregone economic benefits from harvest of the strong stock, while managing for the 
strong stock may result in overfishing of the weak stock.  A particular complication arises when the 
stocks are not easily distinguished in the catch, for example when the stocks are of the same or a similar 
species.  This paper demonstrates how the partially observable Markov decision process can be used to 
explore policy options for managing mixed stock fisheries when the stocks are imperfectly identified.  
Keywords: mixed-stock fisheries, information, partially observable Markov decision process 
INTRODUCTION  
Distinct stocks of fish are often caught together in assemblages, which poses particular management 
challenges addressed by the growing literature on multi species fisheries.  This paper considers a 
particular aspect of the general problem of mixed stock or mixed species fisheries, namely the 
management of the fishery when the degree of mixing among stocks or species is difficult to assess.  The 
purpose of the analysis here is to demonstrate the application of the partially observable Markov decision 
process (POMDP) to explore the trade offs between less fishing, which provides better protection of weak 
stocks, and more fishing, which generates greater revenues and also—importantly—more information. 
 
The analysis here is a response to the situation in the salmon troll fishery along the coasts of Oregon and 
California in the United States.  There, the ocean salmon troll fishery targets primarily chinook salmon, 
predominantly Central Valley fall run chinook or Klamath River fall run chinook, which mingle in the 
open ocean.  In recent years, the fishery has relied heavily on the Central Valley stock, while the Klamath 
stock has been generally weak.  Prosecution of the fishery has been constrained by the need to protect the 
Klamath stock.  A particular challenge in this type of  ‘weak stock management’ is determining how 
much the weak stock is actually threatened by the fishery targeting the strong stock, and what 
management actions are likely to strike a successful balance between protecting the weak stock and 
allowing harvest of the stock stock.   
 
Routledge (2001) analyzes the case in which effort can be directed away from a mixed stock fishery to a 
single stock terminal fishery, in particular demonstrating the disincentives for protecting the weak stock.  
Here, we consider a somewhat different case, in which a strong and a weak stock may or may not be 
mixed at a particular time, and the question is whether to allow fishing or to temporarily close the fishery 
in order to protect the weak stock.  The essence of the approach taken here is to identify the optimal 
policy as a function of managers’ confidence in the state (i.e., the degree of mixing among stocks) of the 
fishery, given costly and imperfect observations on this status.  Available scientific methods can 
determine the stock of a particular fish with a good deal of confidence.  Barnett Johnson et al. (2006), for 
example, report being able to distinguish wild from hatchery salmon with 90% accuracy, and natal river 
of wild salmon with 95% accuracy, based on strontium isotope ratios in otolihs.  Genetic Stock 
Identification (GSI) is another means of determining the mixing of stocks that has been repeatedly applied 
to Pacific salmon fisheries (Winans et al. 2001).  However, there is substantial cost in obtaining estimates 
of stock mixing, and better estimates will generally entail greater costs.    
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The POMDP approach to mixed stock fisheries management may be thought of as a particular 
formalization of adaptive management, in that decisions are made in a dynamic and stochastic 
environment based on beliefs that change as new information becomes available.  Below, the approach is 
demonstrated in a stylized example of a fishery in which managers may choose at any time to switch 
between a fully open fishery, a limited ‘test’ fishery intended to provide some revenue to the fleet along 
with some information (based on catch composition) to fisheries managers, and a fully closed fishery.  
The result of the analysis is an optimal policy that maps managers’ beliefs about the status of the mixed 
stock fishery into actions that maximize the expected value of the stream of fisheries revenues over time, 
taking into account the cost of stock information and its evolution over the decision horizon. 
 
 
MODEL 
 
The POMDP is a collection of sets {S, P, A, W, Θ, R} (Cassandra 1994), where S is the system’s state 
variables, P represents state dynamics as transition probabilities, A is the actions available to an agent, W 
is the rewards to taking particular actions in particular states, Θ  is a set of possible observations on the 
state variables, and R is a set of observation probabilities.  Observations θ∈Θ are the only information the 
agent  has  on  the  unobservable  true  state,  S.    The  observation  model  R  describes  the  probabilistic 
relationship between observations θ and the true state S.  The problem solver (here, the fishery manager) 
uses observations θ and the observation model R to estimate the state S.   
The model assumes the manager’s goal is to maximize long run discounted total value of the 
fishery, which includes the cost of monitoring stock  mixing.  The actions that achieve this goal are 
identified with dynamic programming (Bertsekas 2000) through a recursively defined value function V: 
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V is the greatest expected net benefit that the agent can achieve over time, taking into account that as 
conditions change in the future, different actions may be warranted.  The solution of V yields an optimal 
policy, which is a mapping from beliefs about the current state, π(S), into the optimal action.   
In our setting, the state variable S is the degree of mixing between two fish stocks, which for 
expository purposes takes only two possible values, Pure Strong if only the strong stock is present and 
otherwise Mixed.  The action set A consists of Normal fishing (i.e., allowing the fishery to proceed along 
customary lines), Test fishing (i.e., allow a limited effort fishery that yields less catch than the Normal 
fishery but still provides some revenue and also some catch based information), and Suspend fishing (i.e., 
temporarily close the fishery entirely).  Each action is available in each period.  The observation set 
consists of the same two possible values as S, Pure Strong and Mixed, but an observation of θ = Pure 
Strong does not necessarily mean that the true state S = Pure Strong.  Instead, we define an observation 
model R as follows: IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Each matrix, with the state  S j∈  defined by row and each observation θ defined by column, defines the 
probabilistic relationship of observation to true state under a different action.  
1
θ j R , for example, tells us 
that after taking action a=1 (Normal) and moving to the unobservable state j=Pure Strong, we would 
observe θ=Pure Strong with 99% probability and θ=Mixed with 1% probability.  That is, prosecuting the 
Normal fishery yields a very high quality signal of the true state of mixing (‘what you see is what you 
get’).  
2
θ j R , in contrast, tells us that allowing a limited Test fishery (a=2), yields a weaker basis for 
inference on S, because with fewer fish being caught, the probability that the true state reveals itself is 
less.  Finally,  3
θ j R  indicates that immediately after choosing to Suspend the fishery, observations based on 
no catch tell us nothing about the true state of mixing in the fishery—each possible observation is equally 
likely under any given state, so an observation cannot tell us anything about the probability that the 
fishery is in a particular state.   
The stochastic dynamics of the mixing state S are given by transition probability matrices defined 
as follows: 
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These matrices embody the assumption that the transition probabilities (e.g., probability of moving from 
Pure Strong at time t to Mixed at time t+1) are invariant to the decision made by the manager.  Thus, 
while there is a 10% chance that a Mixed stock becomes Pure Strong from t to t+1, this chance is the 
same regardless of what the manager does. 
Finally, the reward structure is as follows: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 0 0 1 1 3 5
3 2 1 = − = − = j j j W W W  
 
Here the columns of each vector represent the rewards (in unspecified units) of taking a particular action 
in a particular state.  W
1 tells us that allowing the Normal fishery while in the Pure Strong state will 
generate a payoff of 5, while allowing the Normal fishery in the Mixed state will lead to a penalty of  3 
(which may represent lost social welfare, actual financial penalties imposed on the fleet, or any other sort 
of loss).  W
2, the payoffs to the Test fishery, are smaller in magnitude (both reward and penality) due to 
the reduction of catch under this action.  Finally, W
3 tells us that suspending the fishery will not result in 
any reward or penalty.  Comparing these payoff vectors, it’s obvious that if the manager knew the true 
state to be Pure Strong, the best choice would be to implement the Normal (a=1) fishery, and if the 
manager knew the true state to be Mixed, the best thing to do would be to Suspend (a=3).   However, the 
premise of the model, and the reality that managers generally face, is that the true state is unknown. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Figure 1 shows the value function, V, as it evolves over a 5 period decision horizon (the lowest solid line 
is V in period T 1, the next down is V in period T 2, etc.).  The black lines show the division of the state 
space into policy regions, i.e., the beliefs for which the actions Normal, Test, or Suspend are optimal.  The 
most salient features of the solution are that 1) as the decision horizon lengthens, Suspend is the optimal 
action for a progressively smaller portion of the belief space, and 2) Test enters the optimal policy at T 2 IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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and becomes the optimal action over a larger portion of the belief space as the decision horizon lengthens.  
This is because information generated under the Test fishery has more value in longer term planning, 
since it can be used to inform more decisions.  
 
 
 
 
Further iteration on the value function could be used to explore the optimal policy for a decision horizon 
of any desired length.  Our example here has been stylized both for ease of presentation and because 
POMDPs are known to be computationally intractable.  Research on solution techniques for POMDPs is 
an active field in applied mathematics—more fully developed applications to fisheries management will 
employ recently developed heuristics to allow for larger state and action sets. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
While restrictions on fishing effort may help to protect weak fish stocks, in many cases they also impose 
costs in terms of both foregone revenue and foregone information. The POMDP provides a tool for 
assessing the information value of a particular policy, which derives from the utility of whatever can be 
learned from fishing now about the likely current and future states of the fishery.  Of particular interest 
are cases in which information value reverses the optimal choice between two candidate policies, as when 
a policy that appears to be suboptimal becomes optimal by virtue of the learning opportunity it affords.  
This is the idea of ‘probing’ policies from the dual control literature, which has been discussed in a 
fisheries setting by Walters (1986).  
In the stylized model presented here, we found that for a 5 period decision horizon, implementing 
a Test fishery is optimal over a range of beliefs concerning the mixing state of the fishery, by virtue of the 
fact  that  the  Test  fishery  provides  more  information  that  is  not  available  when  managers  choose  to 
Suspend the fishery.  In this example, for most beliefs the opportunity cost of suspending the fishery 
exceed the expected benefit—suspending was preferred only when the manager had a fairly strong a 
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priori belief that the fishery was Mixed.  Of course, these results are specific to the  parameter values 
applied in this ad hoc example—a different parameter set may yield very different results. 
Where do the beliefs about the degree of mixing come from?  They are subjective beliefs that 
may  come  from  personal  experience,  field  experiments,  studies  from  other  areas,  or  other  sources, 
updated within the model by incorporating new observations by Bayes’ rule.  That is, the POMDP is a 
Bayesian decision framework in which to change as the information set changes.  Because different 
individuals will generally have different priors, they will at any given time have different beliefs even 
though they update their beliefs based on the same observations.  While this may lead them to different 
conclusions regarding the best policy, it will often be the case the people with quite different beliefs about 
the state of the system can nonetheless agree on a policy.  For example, in the example developed above, 
an individual who believes the probability that the stock is Pure Strong is 100% and another who believes 
this probability is only 50% should still be able to agree that the expected value maximizing policy is the 
Normal fishery. 
Of course, maximizing expected value may not be the managers’ objective.  While we suspect 
that  imposing  a  risk averse  utility  function  in  the  POMDP  will  require  significant  algorithmic 
enhancement, forward simulation of candidate policies provides a basis for comparing the likely ranges of 
outcomes and associated statistics (e.g., performance variance).  While this simulation approach is not 
equivalent to solution for a risk averse objective function, it is easily implemented and provides a more 
rigorous basis for risk assessment than is usual in fisheries management. 
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